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ABSTRACT 
This paper exammes the law as it relates to transactions involving self-interest. It 
examines the traditional common law position on the subject, the regime under the 
Companies Act 1955, the new regime under the Companies Act 1993 and the North 
American statutes that the provisions in the Companies Act 1993 were modelled on. 
The writer concludes that the new regime in the Companies Act 1993 is unique, a New 
Zealand hybrid of provisions from the North American statutes and other provisions which 
have no obvious equivalent in other jurisdictions. While the new regime remedies many of 
the inadequacies in the law under the 1955 Act, it is considered that the reforms are not 
consistently worked through the new legislation. The new Act applies an unwieldy and 
inconsistent regime, especially in the context of closely held companies. Whether the 
problems identified during the course of this paper will, in practice, have a significant 
impact on the management of company business remains, of course, to be seen. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and appendices) 
comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1 
2 
A. Statutory Foundation 
Directors and the companies they manage are creatures of statute. It is from this simple 
proposition that any examination of the role of directors must begin. Modern statutes 
confer on the board of directors the key role of management of the company's business 
and affairs. The Companies Act 1993 ("the Act") is no exception. In particular, s128(1) 
of the Act provides: 
"The business and affairs of a company must be managed by, or under the 
direction or supervision of, the board of the company" . 
Accordingly, the Act both authorises and obligates directors to manage the company. 
Many other responsibilities are imposed on directors, both by statute and by the common 
law. Traditionally the duties of directors have been imposed by the common law. Perhaps 
none of these duties are more significant than the imposition of fiduciary duties. In 
Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros, 1 Lord Cranworth LC made his classic and often 
cited statement:2 
"A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is, of course, the duty of those 
agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs 
they are conducting. Such an agent has duties to discharge of a fiduciary character 
towards his principal, ... " 
Such fiduciary duties can be categorised under two broad heads: 
(1) the duty ofloyalty; and 
(2) the duty to act with reasonable care and diligence. 
(1854) Macq HL 461 , [1843-60] All ER 249. See Part II A of this paper for further 
analysis. 
Ibid at 252 
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The duty of loyalty may also be described as the duty to act in good faith and in the best 
interests of the company. It is the basic fiduciary duty governing the conduct of directors. 3 
In tum, this duty can be categorised under two further heads: 
(1) the duty to act for a proper purpose; and 
(2) the duty to avoid advancing a conflict of interest. 
It is the duty to avoid advancing a conflict of interest which is the focus of this paper. 
In the preface to the Law Commission's second report on Company Law Reform (No. 16 
1990) the Commission stated that it had identified overwhelming support for the 
proposition that the law on directors' duties should be extracted from the common law and 
made accessible under companies statute. The Commission went on to state: 
"Any definition of directors' duties in a companies statute raises the question of the 
relevance of the previous common law. The Commission has refrained from a 
recommendation that its proposals on directors' duties be described as a code but 
is confident that the courts would recognise a statutory set of directors' duties as 
the text of first resort in considering issues in that area." 
It remains to be seen what approach the Courts will take. Given the deletion of clause 
116 from the Companies Bill (which expressly preserved the common law) and the 
direction in the long title that the Act "defines" the relationship between companies and 
their directors, there is indicia that the Act does purport to be a code. 
However, many of the Act's provisions relating to directors' duties really only restate the 
common law duties rather than reform them. Accordingly, the Courts will no doubt draw 
on the existing body of the common law to assist in the exercise of interpreting the Act's 
provisions. In addition, the directors' duties provided for in the Act are expressed in broad 
terms and therefore the Courts will necessarily play a role in shaping and defining the 
extent of these duties. 
DO Jones Company Law in New Zealand: A Guide to the Companies Act 
1993, Butterworths, 1993, Wellington at 105 
3 
The provisions in the Act relating to self-interested transactions may well be in a separate 
category. Sections 139-149, 161 and 162 of the Act set out a new regime of provisions to 
govern transactions involving self-interest which appear to be exhaustive and form a 
statutory code. It is clear that this new regime significantly reforms the law as it relates to 
self-interested transactions. 
B. Self-Interested Transactions 
It is not difficult for directors to become involved in both sides of a corporate transaction. 
There are many reasons why this may occur. It may be because of some relationship with 
or interest in the other contracting party. The director may also be a director of the other 
contracting company. Or the director may have a friend or family member with whom the 
company deals. It may be that the transaction involves the director's own property. Or it 
becomes necessary for the success of the transaction that the director, in a personal 
capacity, becomes a party. 
In any such situation, the director's loyalties will be divided. Necessarily, it can be 
questioned whether the director has bargained on behalf of the company as well as he or 
she possibly could. 
Prior to the intervention of company statutes, it fell to the Courts of Equity to deal with 
what was (and still is) a fact of corporate life. Applying classic principles of equity, the 
Courts provided a common law regime in respect to self-interested transactions. 
II. THE COMMON LAW POSITION 
A. Absolute Rule 
As fiduciaries, at common law, directors owe an abslute duty not to be interested in a 
transaction to which their company is a party. This equitable principle can be traced back 
4 
5 
6 
4 
to the leading trust case of Keech v Sandford4 and is classically stated by Lord 
Cransworth LC in Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros. :5 
" ... it is a rule of universal application that no one having [fiduciary] duties to 
discharge shall be allowed to enter into arrangements in which he has or can have a 
personal interest conflicting or which possibly may conflict with the interests of 
those whom he is bound to protect." 
In this case, a Mr Blaikie was a partner of the plaintiff firm and a director of the defendant 
company. The firm contracted to supply goods to the company. However, for reasons 
not disclosed in the judgment, the company refused to accept delivery of the goods. The 
firm sued seeking specific performance or, in the alternative, damages. Despite the fact 
that the terms of the contract were fair, the Court held that the company was entitled to 
avoid the contract. 
"So strictly is this principle adhered to that no question is allowed to be raised as 
to the fairness or unfairness of a contract so entered into. 116 
Because directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to their companies, at common law, any 
contract between them and the company can be avoided by the company. The rule is so 
absolute that it is simply irrelevant that the contract maybe fair and reasonable. It is also 
irrelevant that the director concerned may have made disclosure of his or her interest to 
the board. And, it matters not that the director may not have attended the board meeting 
or did not vote on the matter or an independent quorum authorised the transaction. 
( 1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; [ 15 5 8-1774] All ER Rep 23 0. In this case, the lease of a 
market was devised to a trustee for the benefit of an infant. Shortly before the 
expiry of the lease, the trustee applied to the lessor for a renewal for the benefit of 
the infant. The lessor refused to renew the lease for various reasons, but granted 
a new lease to the trustee. The infant sued to have the lease assigned to him and 
for an account of the profits, on the principle that wherever a lease is renewed by 
a trustee or executor, it must be for the benefit of "cestui que use" (he to whose use 
land is held). Lord King LC found for the infant observing that if a trustee, on the refusal 
to renew, might have a lease to himself, few trust estates would be renewed to "cestui 
que use". He concluded that "it is very proper that rules should be strictly pursued, and 
not in the least relaxed; for it is very obvious what would be the consequences of letting 
trustees have the lease on refusal to renew to "cestui que use" (at 231). 
[1843-60] All ER 249 at 252 
Ibid 
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The rationale behind such a strict rule has been explained thus:7 
"Good faith must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done, and the 
law will not allow a fiduciary to place himself in a position in which his judgment is 
likely to be biased and then to escape liability by denying that in fact it was biased." 
Therefore, at common law, in the absence of any express provision in the company's 
articles, the only effective way of overcoming this problem was to make full disclosure to 
the members of the company and to have the transaction ratified by the company at 
general meeting. 
B. Possibility of Conflict 
The strictness of the common law position is illustrated by the requirement that it is not 
necessary to show that there was an actual conflict of duty and interest. In Aberdeen 
Railway Co v Blaikie Bros.8, Lord Cranworth LC said:9 
"No one having [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into 
arrangements in which he has or can have a personal interest conflicting or which 
possibly may conflict with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect." 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
The test of "possibly may conflict" was reviewed by the House of Lords in Boardman v 
Phipps10 where Lord Upjohn said:11 
LCB Gower Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law (5th ed) Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1992, London at 559 
nl 
Ibid at 252 
[1967] 2 AC 46 
Ibid at 124 
12 
6 
"The phrase "possibly may conflict" requires consideration. In my view it means 
that the reasonable man looking at the relevant facts and circumstances of the 
particular case would think that there was a real sensible possibility of conflict; not 
that you could imagine some situation arising which might, in some conceivable 
possibility in events not contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any 
reasonable person result in a conflict. 1112 
(Again, the underlining is the writer's) 
In this case, the defendants were not company directors but a trustee and the 
trust's solicitor. The defendants had acted as agents of the trustees in respect of a 
company in which the trust had a substantial investment. Dissatisfied with the 
company's accounts, the defendants decided that the best course of action would 
be to try and obtain control of the company by making a takeover bid. Then, by a 
liquidation of the company's assets, they would make a repayment of capital to the 
shareholders. As there were difficulties in using the trust fund for bidding, the 
defendants obtained, or so they thought, the consent of all of the trustees and 
beneficiaries to bid on their behalf and at their expense. After protracted 
negotiations with the other shareholders the defendants acquired their shares, some 
at £3 a share, but most at £4. lOs a share. The purchases proved to be profitable 
and the company was able to make distributions totalling £5.17s.6d, after which 
the shares were still worth more than £2 a share. Therefore, the trust with 8000 
shares did very well, but the defendants who ended up with 22, OOO shares did even 
better making a profit of over £75,000. Unfortunately for the defendants, the 
Court found that the defendants did not adequately explain their proposed course 
of action to the plaintiff, one of the beneficiaries of the trust. Therefore they had 
to account for the profit attributable to the plaintiff's share in the trust. 
Interestingly, the House of Lords held that the defendants were entitled to deduct 
payment, on a liberal scale, for their work and skill which for otherwise no profit 
would have been made. 
Lord Upjohn delivered a dissenting judgment but this was on the facts, not the law. The 
test of "real sensible possibility of conflict" has since been applied by the Privy Council in 
Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 18 ALR 1. See also Chan v Zacharia (1984) 53 
ALR 417 and Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 55 ALR 
417. 
13 
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C. Extent of Interest 
The strict regime of the common law position was continued in respect of the extent of 
the interest required before the transaction was affected. The old authorities thought the 
extent of interest irrelevant. In Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and 
Development Co13, Swinfen Eady L.J. said: 14 
11 
••• the validity or invalidity of a transaction cannot depend upon the extent of the 
adverse interest of the fiduciary agent any more than upon how far m any 
particular case the terms of a contract have been the best obtainable ... 11 
Such a strict doctrine if applied literally has bizarre consequences. For example, say, a 
director of a computer software company owns 100 $1 shares in a brewery company. If 
the computer company purchases some of the brewery company's products for a client 
function and the director does not disclose his or her interest in the brewery company, 
then technically the director is in breach of duty. 
Not surprisingly, more modem authority has tempered the strictness of the rule. In 
Boulting v Cinematography Assocn. etc., 15 Upjohn LJ said in discussing the ambit of the 
rule: 16 
[1914] 2 Ch 488 
Ibid at 503. In this case, the plaintiff company successfully sought to rescind contracts 
entered into with the defendant company on the grounds that a director of the plaintiff 
company held shares in the defendant company. The Court rejected an argument that 
the director held the shares only as a trustee made a difference. 
[1963] 1 All ER 716 
Ibid at 730. The plaintiffs were managing directors and employees of a film production 
company. The defendant union required the plaintiffs to join the union under its 
membership rules. The plaintiffs argued that the membership rules were ultra vires or 
unlawful in that they purported to make those whose principal functions were 
managerial, eligible to join what was essentially an employees' union. The English Court 
of Appeal held that the principle that no person who had a duty to perform should place 
himself in a position where he had interests that conflicted with the performance of the 
duty was a principle for the protection of the person to whom the duty was owed, who 
could relax it if he thought fit. Therefore the principle did not entitle the plaintiffs (who 
owed a duty to the company), as distinct from the company which was not a party to the 
action, to have set aside or declared void as illegal the membership rule of the union, even 
though it may lead to conflicts of interest. 
17 
18 
19 
8 
"It must be applied realistically to a state of affairs which discloses a real conflict 
of duty and interest, and not to some theoretical or rhetorical conflict." 
A more recent example of discussion on the extent of interest required before a 
transaction is affected at common law is provided by the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales in Anaray Pty Ltd v Sydney Futures Exchange Ltd & Ors.17 In this case a director 
had a minor interest in one of a number of contracts that were affected by the decision of 
the board of the Sydney Futures Exchange to extend the delivery period of trade steer 
contracts in the futures market. The director had disclosed his interest to the board but 
had voted on the resolution to extend the delivery period. The Court said that it was of 
the utmost importance: 18 
" ... to have regard to the nature of the company's functions and the constitution of 
the board of directors and the powers of the board to determine whether the 
principle is in fact brought into play." 
The Court noted that the company had a number of articles prohibiting directors from 
voting on specific types of resolutions where they had an interest which could be affected 
by the resolutions. But the Court found that, in respect to other resolutions: 19 
11 
• • • it is contemplated that a director is free to vote in a matter in which he has 
declared an interest, subject always to his own bona fide decision that he should 
not do so when the nature of the interest is of such a character or size as to affect 
his decision or give reasonable cause for apprehension that it might be so. 11 
On the facts of the case the director's interest was not of such a nature and therefore the 
resolution was not affected. 
(1988) 6 ACLC 271 
Ibid at 276 
Ibid at 277 
9 
D. Disclosure and Avoidance 
20 
21 
22 
23 
At common law, where a director had placed him or herself in a position of conflict, the 
contract is voidable at the option of the company. The company must either affirm or 
avoid the contract. The only effective way of overcoming the problem was to make full 
disclosure to the members of the company and to have the transaction ratified by the 
company at general meeting. While, almost invariably, this requirement is waived by the 
company's articles, it is nevertheless still the law. As Fox LJ said in Guinness plc v 
Saunders:20 
"A person in a fiduciary position is not permitted to obtain a profit from his 
position except with the consent of his beneficiaries or other persons to whom he 
owes the duty. In the case of a director the consent required is that of the 
members in general meeting." 
Disclosure to the board alone was thought to be inadequate because the board would be 
unable to give independent and unbiased judgment on the merits of the transaction. As 
Gower commented:21 
"It hardly seems over-cynical to suggest that disclosure to one's cronies is a less 
effective restraint on self-seeking than disclosure to those for whom one is a 
fiduciary." 
If the company elects to avoid the contract, two ( or perhaps three
22) consequences 
follow. First, the contract is voidable against any party who has notice of the breach of 
duty, 23 though the company's right of avoidance will lapse if it affirmed the contract, or it 
[1988] 2 All ER 940 at 944. This was one of many cases that followed the take-over 
battle for Distillers plc. A Guinness director, a Mr Ward, was also a director of 
another company, MAC. Guinness paid MAC £5 .2 million for services relating to the 
take-over bid. As Ward had failed to disclose his interest in MAC, Guinness was entitled 
to judgment for the £5 .2 million. This was despite any claim Ward had by way of 
quantum meruit or equitable compensation for services rendered. 
LCB Gower Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed), Stevens & Sons, 
1979, London at 587. 
Under some articles, an interested director was disqualified and had to vacate office 
e.g. Table B to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 (UK). 
For example, see n13 at 499 
10 
delays unduly before electing to avoid, or third parties have acquired rights in the 
meantime. 24 As a condition of recession of a voidable contract, the parties must be put in 
"status quo" . For this purpose a Court of Equity will endeavour to do what is practically 
just, even though it may not be able to restore the parties precisely to the state they were 
in before the contract. 25 The second consequence is that any profit which the director 
gains from the contract is recoverable by the company, even if the contract was fair and 
reasonable26 and/or that the profits made could not have been made by the company 
without the skills and diligence of the director.27 If the shareholders at general meeting 
sanction the director's interest, then the contract ceases to be voidable and the directors 
may retain any profits. 
In practice, the strictness of the common law rules proved to be unworkable. Contracts 
with directors, such as contracts of service, and contracts with other companies which had a 
common director, were not uncommon. Indeed there may be good commercial reasons for a 
company to contract with a director.28 Faced with the prospect of having to submit all such 
contracts to a general meeting of the company with the resultant delays and possible 
embarrassment, not surprisingly, these fiduciary duties of directors became modified by express 
provision in the company's constitution. It became increasingly common for the articles of 
companies to include waiver clauses which abrogated the common law principles. However, it 
would seem that some of these waiver clauses went too far . As Gower explained:29 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
"Alarmed by the increasing ambit of these clauses, the legislative intervened." 
Ibid 
Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 at 697 
Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros [1843-60] All ER 249 at 252 
Costa Rica Railway Company Ltd v Forwood [ 1901] 1 Ch 7 46 at 7 61 . In this case, 
Forwood was a director of both contracting parties. No disclosure was made but on 
the facts of the case the English Court of Appeal found for Forwood. Nevertheless, 
the principle above is of general application. 
See V. Brudrey "The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village? 
(1982) 95 Harv L. Rev 597 at 624 
n7 at 561 
11 
ID. SELF-INTERESTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1955 
A. Legislative Intervention 
30 
At one extreme a waiver clause in the articles of association of a company might adopt the 
inflexible rules of the common law. At the other end of the scale, a waiver clause might 
provide that a contract will be fully enforceable notwithstanding any interest by a director 
and the director will not be liable to account for any profit made. Further, the interested 
director may attend any meeting and even vote to authorise the transaction. It was such 
liberally drafted waiver clauses that caused the legislature to intervene and introduce 
minimum standards of disclosure. 
Since 193330 the legislature has placed directors under a duty to declare their interests in a 
contract, or a proposed contract, with the company at a meeting of the directors. Section 
199 of the Companies Act 1955 ("the 1955 Act") provided: 
"SECTION 199 DISCLOSURE BY DIRECTORS OF INTERESTS IN CON1RACTS 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, it shall be the duty of a director of a company who 
is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with 
the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company. 
(2) In the case of a proposed contract the declaration required by this section to be made by a 
director shall be made at the meeting of the directors at which the question of entering into the 
contract is first taken into consideration, or if the director was not at the date of that meeting 
interested in the proposed contract, at the next meeting of the directors held after he became so 
interested, and in a case where the director becomes interested in a contract after it is made, the 
said declaration shall be made at the first meeting of the directors held after the director becomes 
so interested. 
(3) For the purpose of this section, a general notice given to the directors of a company by a 
director to the effect that he is a member of a specified company or firm and is to be regarded as 
interested in any contract which may, after the date of the notice, be made with that company or 
firm shall be deemed to be a sufficient declaration of interest in relation to any contract so made: 
Provided that no such notice shall be of effect unless either it is given at a meeting of the 
directors or the director takes reasonable steps to secure that it is brought up and read at the next 
meeting of the directors after it is given. 
(4) Any director who fails to comply with the provisions of this section shall be liable to a fine 
not exceeding $200. 
Originally sl55 of the Companies Act 1933 which became sl99 of the Companies Act 
1955. The section is taken from the Companies Act 1929(UK), section 149. 
31 
12 
(5) Nothing in thls section shall be taken to prejudice the operation of any rule of law restricting 
directors of a company from having any interests in contracts with the company." 
Coupled with s 19931, further restrictions upon interested directors were prescribed by 
Article 84 of Table A in the Third Schedule to the 1955 Act. Article 84 provided: 
"84. (1) A director who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or 
proposed contract with the company shall declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the 
directors in accordance with section 199 of the Act. 
(2) A director shall not vote in respect of any contract or arrangement in which he is interested, 
and if he does so his vote shall not be counted, nor shall he be counted in the quorum present at 
the meeting, but neither of these prohibitions shall apply to -
(a) Any arrangement for giving any director any security or indemnity in respect of 
money lent by him to or obligations undertaken by him for the benefit of the company; 
or 
(b) Any arrangement for the giving by the company of any security to a third party in 
respect of a debt or obligation of the company for which the director himself had 
assumed responsibility in whole or in part under a guarantee or indemnity or by the 
deposit of a security; or 
(c) Any contract by a director to subscribe for or underwrite shares or debentures of the 
company; or 
(d) Any contract or arrangement with any other company in which he is interested only 
as an officer of the company or as a holder of shares or other securities, -
and these prohibitions may at any time be suspended or relaxed to any extent, and either 
generally or in respect of any particular contract, arrangement, or transaction, by the company in 
general meeting. 
(3) A director may hold any other office or place of profit under the company (other than the 
office of auditor) in conjunction with his office or director for such period and on such terms (as 
to remuneration and otherwise) as the directors may determine, and no director or intending 
director shall be disqualified by his office from contracting with the company, either with regard 
to his tenure of any such other office or place of profit or as vendor, purchaser, or otherwise, nor 
shall any such contract, or any contract or arrangement entered into by or on behalf of the 
company in which any director is in any way interested, be liable to be avoided, nor shall any 
director so contracting or being so interested by liable to account to the company for any profit 
realised by any such contract or arrangement by reason of the director holding that office or of 
the fiduciary relation thereby established. 
(4) A director, notwithstanding his interest, may be counted in the quorum present at any 
meeting whereat he or any other director is appointed to hold any such office or place of profit 
under the company or whereat the terms of any such appointment are arranged, and he may vote 
on any such appointment or arrangement other than his own appointment or the arrangement of 
the terms thereof. 
Article 84(1) incorporated s199 as its first procedural step. 
13 
(5) Any director may act by himself or his firm in a professional capacity for the company, and 
he or his firm shall be entitled to remuneration for professional services as if he were not a 
director: 
Provided that nothing therein contained shall authorise a director or his firm to act as auditor to 
the company." 
Because adoption of the prescribed table of articles was not mandatory, 32 the practice 
became either to exclude or modify the regulations in Table A. 33 Accordingly, the 
formulation of waiver clauses varied widely. Typical variations permitted interested 
directors to be included in the quorum and to vote in respect of a contract in which he or 
she was interested. Further variations existed as to the extent that Table A was integrated 
into the registered articles. 
B. Case Law 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Until the 1980s there was little judicial consideration of the 195 5 Act's regime to govern 
self-interested transactions. However, two decisions of the High Court, Saunders v 
Liquidator of Woodware Products Ltd34 ("Woodware Products") and David Neil & Co 
Ltd (in rec) v Neil35 ("David Neil") highlighted a number of unsatisfactory aspects to the 
law in this area, particularly in the context of closely held companies. 
1) The Woodware Products case 
In the Woodware Products case, a Mr and Mrs Saunders were the sole shareholders of a 
private company. Mr Saunders was governing director for life. 36 Mrs Saunders was 
Section 22(1) of the 1955 Act provided: 
"(l) Articles of association~ adopt all or any of the regulations contained 
in Table A" 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
Section 24 of the 1955 Act sanctioned alteration of articles by special resolution. 
(1982) 1 NZCLC 98, 341 
(1986) 3 NZCLC 99, 658 
In accordance with ss180(1) and 354(2)(c) of the 1955 Act. 
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secretary. The articles of the company allowed a director to vote in respect of a contract 
in which he or she was interested, provided disclosure was made in accordance with s 199. 
The company had an account with the Bank of New Zealand with an overdraft facility 
personally guaranteed by Mr Saunders. Later, and without releasing the guarantee, the 
bank required the company to give a debenture as further security for its overdraft. The 
debenture was executed by the company at a meeting attended by Mr and Mrs Saunders 
and the company's solicitor. At the same meeting the solicitor prepared a resolution, 
pursuant to s362 of the 1955 Act, which was signed by Mr and Mrs Saunders, noting the 
execution of the debenture. 
Subsequently, the company went into voluntary liquidation, whereupon the overdraft debt 
became immediately due and payable. Accordingly, the bank made demand on Mr 
Saunders under his guarantee. Mr Saunders duly paid the amount due, thereby becoming 
entitled to take an assignment of the debenture. Mr Saunders then sought to prove in the 
liquidation as a secured creditor. The liquidator rejected Mr Saunder's proof of debt on 
the grounds that the debenture was invalid. The liquidator argued that Mr Saunders was 
personally interested in the debenture transaction because he had personally guaranteed 
the overdraft. Therefore he was not competent to vote or be counted in the quorum at the 
meeting which had authorised the execution of the debenture. 
The first issue that the Court had to consider was whether there had been disclosure in 
accordance with sl99 and the articles of the company. To that, Hardie Boys J said:37 
"The disclosure required is thus one made to a meeting of directors. Although it 
has been held that in an appropriate context there may be a "meeting" of one 
person (e.g. East v Bennett Bros. Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 163 per Warrington J. at p.168, 
170)38 there is no reason to interpret either the Act or the articles of this company 
in a way that requires a sole director to call a meeting of himself in order that he 
may disclose to himself what he already knows. 11 
Not only did Hardie Boys J hold that a meeting was not required, but disclosure did not 
have to be in writing:39 
n34 at 98, 345 
See Part IIID of this paper for further analysis 
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"The cautious would no doubt put compliance beyond question by recording the 
disclosure in a minute. But the section does not seem to require that the disclosure 
be in writing, unless it is a general notice given pursuant to subsec.(3). What is 
required is "a declaration", a word which comprehends an oral as well as a written 
statement. The section is in marked contrast to sec.198, which specifies that the 
disclosure it requires be in writing. So the absence of writing is not relevant. That 
being so, it would be impossible to prove breach of sec.199 where there is but one 
director; and that leads me to the conclusion that the section is not relevant to such 
a situation." 
Hardie Boys J noted that the duty of disclosure required by the articles of the company, 
i.e. to a meeting of directors, meant, in the case of such a single director company, Mr 
Saunders disclosing his interest to himself An exercise one might well think of somewhat 
dubious utility. But Hardie Boys J further noted that the situation would be no different 
to where all the directors might be interested in the transaction. 
In such circumstances, Hardie Boys J suggested that disclosure by each of the directors to 
the others may not suffice, unless there was clear direction to that effect in the articles. 40 
But, in this case, there was no such direction. Therefore, if a director's fiduciary duty 
could not be effectively discharged by disclosure to the directors, either because there is 
only one director, or because they are all interested in the transaction, it may be necessary 
for disclosure to be made to the shareholders.41 On the facts of the case, Hardie Boys J 
found there had been such disclosure, as the only other shareholder, Mrs Saunders, had 
implicitly consented to the ratification of the breach of duty:42 
11 
••• Mrs Saunders concurred in the contract. Even if Mr Saunders was in breach 
of his obligation by not telling his wife in so many words what was well known to 
her, her assent to the contract, in full knowledge of the facts, was sufficient to bind 
the company." 
Accordingly, the liquidators were directed to admit Mr Saunder's proof of debt. 
Ibid 
Ibid 
n34 at 98, 345 - 98, 346 
43 
16 
2) The David Neil case 
In the David Neil case, a Mr Neil was governing director for life and owned all but one of 
the shares in the company. The company had only one asset, a house property, which was 
security for three mortgages totalling $150,000 and a $300,000 debenture to the ANZ 
bank. The property had been previously valued at between $270,000 and $350,000. In 
July 1984, Mr Neil entered into an agreement for sale and purchase with the company for 
the sale of the property to himself for $275,000. Under the terms of the agreement no 
deposit was required. The purchase price was to be satisfied by the purchaser (Mr Neil) 
assuming the existing liabilities in respect of the property, as at settlement date, to the 
extent of $275,000. Mr Neil then lodged a caveat claiming an interest in the property by 
virtue of the agreement. The next day the bank appointed receivers who purported to 
cancel the agreement and made an application to the Court for removal of the caveat. 
The articles of the company specified that Table A applied, including Article 84, except 
where inconsistent or negatived. The company's Article 9 provided that resolutions of any 
kind could be effected by entry in the minute book. But of central importance was Article 
16 which provided:43 
"16. The governing director shall not be disqualified by his office from holding 
any office or place of profit in the company or from contracting with the company 
whether as vendor or purchaser or otherwise, nor shall any contract or 
arrangement entered into by or on behalf of the company with any company or 
partnership of, or in which, the governing director shall be a member or otherwise 
interested, be avoided. Nor shall the governing director so contracting or being 
such a member or so interested be liable to account for any profit realised by any 
such contract and/or arrangement by reason of the governing director holding 
such office or of the fiduciary relations thereby established, provided that such 
governing director shall declare the nature of his interest in the manner provided 
by sec 199 of the Act". 
(The emphasis is Smellie J's) 
The receivers argued that the sale and purchase agreement was voidable at the option of 
the company because of Mr Neil's non compliance with sl99 and the company's articles in 
n35 at 99, 667 
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failing to declare his interest in the agreement. 44 In the alternative, the receivers argued 
that the agreement was voidable because of Mr Neil's breach of fiduciary duty in selling 
the house at undervalue.45 On the other hand, Mr Neil argued that the fact that the 
agreement had been entered into was effective notice to the board, even if no specific 
written or oral declaration had been made. 46 
In dealing with the receivers' first argument, not surprisingly, Smellie J referred to Hardie 
Boys J's judgment in Woodware Products. While indicating that, in the main, he agreed 
with Hardie Boys J, 47 Smellie J expressed:48 
" . . . some reservation as to whether it can be said that s 199 has no application 
simply because there is one director." 
He concluded that :49 
"Contrary to what is said in Saunder's case I take the view following East v 
Bennett Bros. Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 16350 that this is a case where the articles 
contemplate a meeting with only one attendee." 
However, Smellie J did agree with Hardie Boys J that if there is a duty of disclosure 
required by the articles of the company then that duty must be discharged to prevent 
avoidance. 51 On the facts of the case, Smellie J found that no such disclosure had 
occurred and therefore the agreement for sale and purchase was voidable at the option of 
Ibid at 99, 665 
Ibid 
Ibid at 99, 668 
Ibid at 99, 669 
Ibid 
Ibid 
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the company. In the alternative, Smellie J found that there was no evidence of Mr Neil 
disclosing his interest to the shareholders. 52 
In respect of Mr Neil's argument that the fact that the agreement had been entered into 
constituted effective notice to the board, Smellie J examined Article 84(2) of Table A 
Smellie J noted that, pursuant to Article 84(2), Mr Neil could not vote in favour of a 
resolution to sell to himself Therefore, he found that the agreement was voidable and 
"quite probably void ab initio1153 Accordingly, Smellie J ordered that the caveat be 
removed. 
The Woodware Products case and the David Neil case illustrate a number of difficulties in 
the application of the law in this area. Some of these difficulties are discussed further 
below. 
C. What was the relationship between s199, Article 84 and the common law? 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
It is implicit in Hardie Boys J's judgment, in the Woodware Products case, that he 
considered that the effect of s 199 was to impose a statutory duty of disclosure upon 
directors, separate from the common law. 54 However, there has been academic comment 
to the contrary. In earlier editions of his text, 55 Gower suggested that a breach of s 19956 
removes any protection afforded by the waiver clauses in the articles and brings the 
common law into play. Thereby the transaction is voidable at the option of the company 
and any profits made by the interested director are recoverable. This view has been 
Ibid at 99, 670 
Ibid 
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criticised by other commentators57 and in the latest edition of his text, Gower reviews his 
earlier position. 58 
Strong support for Hardie Boys J's view can be found in the judgments of the House of 
Lords in Guinness plc v Saunders59 and the English Court of Appeal in Rely-Hutchinson v 
Brayhead Ltd60 ("Rely-Hutchinson"). In Rely-Hutchinson, Lord Pearson said:61 
"It is not contended that section 199 in itself affects the contract. The section 
merely creates a statutory duty of disclosure and imposes a fine for non-
compliance. But it has to be read in conjunction with [the article]. If a director 
makes or is interested in a contract but fails to disclose his interest, what happens 
to the contract? Is it void or is it voidable at the option of the company, or is it 
still binding on both parties, or what? I think the answer must be supplied by the 
general law, and the answer is that the contract is voidable at the option of the 
company." 
In Guinness, it was argued by the interested director that, even if there had been a breach 
of the statutory duty of disclosure, the articles of the company,62 still allowed the director 
E .g. CD Baker "Disclosure of Directors' Interests in Contracts" (1975) J.B.L. 181 and 
G L Williams "Interested Directors-Some Recent Cases" (1988) 14 NZ Recent Law 
167 
n7 at 562 
[1990] 2 AC 663 
[1968] 1 QB 549. In this case, Rely-Hutchinson ("H-H") was the chairman and 
managing director of a company named Perdio Electronics Ltd. Perdio was in 
financial difficulties and H-H personally guaranteed a loan to Perdio from a merchant 
bank. This was after H-H had received an undertaking from Brayhead (in which 
H-H was also a director) to indemnify him for any loss under the guarantee. But 
Perdio's financial position remained hopeless and H-H was required to honour the 
guarantee. This he did and, in tum, claimed the indemnity. Brayhead refused, denying 
liability on the grounds that H-H had not disclosed his interest in the transaction as 
required by s199 and by Brayhead's articles. Accordingly, Brayhead argued that the 
indemnity was unenforceable. In short summary, the Court of Appeal found in H-H's 
favour. While there had been a breach of s 199 and Brayhead's articles, this only 
rendered the transactions voidable not void and H-H was entitled to recover. 
Ibid at 594 
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to retain the profits under the contract. The House of Lords rejected this argument. The 
Court held that the English equivalent of s 19963 imposed a separate statutory duty to 
account for profits from contracts where an interested director had failed to make 
disclosure. The articles reaffirmed the statutory duty of disclosure and the equivalent to 
Article 84(3) only applied to contracts where there was no breach of the duty to disclose. 
In respect of the question as to the breach the equivalent of s 199, Lord Goff referred to 
the above passage by Lord Pearson and said:64 
" ... I cannot see that a breach of section 317 [ s 199] ... had itself any effect upon 
the contract65 between [the interested director] and Guinness. As a matter of 
general law, to the extent that there was a failure by [the interested director] to 
comply with his duty of disclosure under the relevant articles of Guinness ... , the 
contract was no doubt voidable under the ordinary principles of the general law to 
which Lord Pearson refers." 
This rather untidy interaction of statutory provisions and the common law has been 
summarised as follows:66 
"(a) If the company's articles include reg 84 or its equivalent then the director 
must make disclosure to the board. This disclosure automatically constitutes 
compliance with sl99. 
(b) If the director fails to comply with the article, he or she is deprived of the 
protection afforded by it and therefore the common law principles [ ] will come 
into operation. The director will also be liable to a fine of up to $200 for failing to 
comply with sl99. 
s3 l 7 of the Companies Act 1985 (UK) 
[1990] 2 AC 663 at 697 
Subsequently, Lord Goff went on to find there was no such contract. 
K. Snook & P . Ratner "Interested Directors" Dimensions in Business Finance Law 
Butterworths, 1992, Wellington at 132, 133 
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( c) Where the articles of association contain no equivalent of reg 84, the general 
common law principles continue to apply, although the director must still disclose 
pursuant to s 199. Section 199 is entirely negative in operation and has no 
validating effect on the contract even if complied with, and sl99(5) expressly 
preserves the operation of the common law rules." 
D. A Meeting of One Director? 
67 
68 
69 
70 
Section 199 required that disclosure must be made at a meeting of the directors. The 
question arose, if a company has only one director, can there be a meeting of directors? 
There was conflicting authority on the point. In the case of Sharp v Dawes67 notice was 
given that a general quarterly meeting of shareholders of a mining company would be held. 
However, only one shareholder turned up for the meeting. Unfazed by this, the 
shareholder took the chair of the meeting and purported to pass a number of resolutions 
including making a call. Subsequently, another of the shareholders refused to pay the call 
and an action was brought against him. The English Court of Appeal found for the 
absentee shareholder. Mellish L J said:68 
"In this case, no doubt, a meeting was duly summoned, but only one shareholder 
attended. It is clear that, according to the ordinary use of the English language, a 
meeting could no more be constituted by one person than a meeting could have 
been constituted if no shareholder at all had attended. No business could be done 
at such a meeting, and the call is invalid." 
The Sharp v Dawes approach, "according to the ordinary use of the English language",69 
has been followed on a number of occasions.70 
However, another approach was to regard the word "meeting", in this context, as having a 
meaning different from the ordinary meaning of the word. In East v Bennett Brothers 
(1876) 2 QBD 26 
Ibid at 29 
Ibid 
See Re Sanitary Carbon Co [1877] WN 223, Re London Flats [1969] 1 WLR 711, 
Re Primary Distributors Ltd [1954] 2 DLR 438 
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Ltd, 71 the company's memorandum and articles of association required that any fresh issue 
of preference shares had to be sanctioned by an extraordinary resolution of preference 
shareholders present at a separate meeting. Shortly after the incorporation of the 
company such a resolution was passed increasing the capital of the company by a fresh 
issue of preference shares. However, at that time, only one shareholder held any 
preference shares. Subsequently, this action was challenged. In distinguishing Sharp v 
Dawes, Warrington J particularly noted the drafting of the memorandum and articles of 
the company. He held that where only one person is the holder of all the shares of a 
particular class, the persons who drafted the memorandum and articles must have had 
such a position in their contemplation and therefore must be taken to have used the word 
"meeting" not in the strict sense.72 This approach was adopted by Hardie Boys J in 
Woodware Products73 and by Smellie Jin David Neil.74 
The problem could be overcome, simply enough, by a specific article providing that the 
attendance of one director constitutes a "meeting". However, somewhat unsatisfactorily, 
the issue turned on the wording of the company's constitutional documents. 
E. Declaration of the Nature of the Interest 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Section 199(1) required a director "to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the 
directors of the company" . As discussed earlier,75 in Woodware Products, Hardie Boys J 
held that disclosure did not have to be in writing, the word "declaration" comprehending 
an oral or a written statement. In that regard, Hardie Boys J compared s 199 with s 198 of 
the 1955 Act, which expressly required disclosure to be in writing. 
[1911] 1 Ch 163 
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While this may have had obvious practical advantages for the interested director, it made 
effective enforcement of sl9976 a nonsense. As Hardie Boys J noted, a breach of sl99 
would be impossible to prove where there was only one director. 77 
Under the 1955 Act regime, it was not sufficient for a director to merely declare that he or 
she had an interest. Section 199( 1) required the "nature" of a direct or indirect interest to 
be disclosed. Immediately, it will be noted that the section contained no criteria of 
materiality. Accordingly, it seemed that the section required disclosure of any interest, 
however trivial or indirect. 78 
As to the common law requirement, in New Zealand Netherlands Society v Kuys,79 the 
Privy Council held:80 
" ... as to disclosure. Their Lordships entirely accept, as a matter oflaw, that if an 
arrangement is to stand, whereby a particular transaction, which would otherwise 
come within a person's fiduciary duty, is to be exempted from it, there must be full 
and frank disclosure of all material facts ." 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
In Woodware Products, Hardie Boys J indicated, without offering anything further, 81 that 
the fiduciary standard (full and frank disclosure of all material facts) may be more than is 
Under sl99(4) any director who failed to comply with sl99 was only liable to a rather 
modest fine of not exceeding $200 
n34 at 98, 345 
J H Farrar & M Russell Company Law & Securities Regulations in New Zealand, 
Butterworths, 1985, Wellington at 242 
[1973] 2 NZLR 163 . In this case, the appellants had obtained an injunction restraining the 
respondent from publishing a newspaper for the Dutch community called "The Windmill 
Post" . The respondent, Kuys, had previously been the secretary and a member of the 
appellant society. The appellant argued that Kuys had acquired ownership of the paper by 
virtue of his position as secretary of the appellant and that Kuys had acquired such 
ownership without full disclosure of all relevant matters to the appellant. The Privy 
Council accepted the existence of a fiduciary relationship but dismissed the appeal, the 
appellants being unable to point to any relevant matter not disclosed by Kuys. 
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required to achieve bare compliance with the statutory duty.82 That there was a separate 
statutory standard of disclosure was consistent with the proposition that there was a 
separate duty to account for profits. 83 But what actually was the statutory standard 
remained unclear. Commentators offered various formulations without agreement. 84 As 
Williams safely concluded, the standard would need to be more than merely stating "I am 
interested" but less than disclosing all material facts. 85 
A further point that remained unclear was whether there was compliance with s 199 where 
all the directors were interested, or where one director "disclosed" to him or herself In 
Woodware Products, Hardie Boys J thought s 199 irrelevant in such situations, 86 so did 
not discuss the point further. But, in David Neil, Smellie J thought s199 did apply to 
single director companies. 87 However, on the facts of the case, he found that there was 
no evidence that disclosure had been made. This suggests that had disclosure been made, 
s 199 would have applied and therefore the agreement for sale and purchase would not 
have been voidable at the option of the company. 
F. Quorums 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
Before there was compliance with s199, disclosure by an interested director had to be 
made at a valid directors' meeting, i.e. a binding quorum must be present.88 What was a 
binding quorum depended on the articles of the individual company. 
Obviously,because on the facts of the case, he did not consider sl99 to be applicable 
(1982) 1 NZCLC 98, 341 at 98, 345 
E.g. Guinness pie v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 
For a summary, see G L Williams "Interested Directors - Some Recent Cases" (1988) 
14 NZ Recent Law 167 at 174, 175 
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Article 99 of Table A provided: 
"The quorum necessary for the transaction of business of the directors may be 
fixed by the directors, and unless so fixed shall be 2. 11 
Obviously then, in the case of single director comparues, Article 99 needed to be 
immediately amended to permit a quorum of one. 
A further impediment to a binding quorum was if the articles prohibited an interested 
director from being counted in the quorum. Article 84(2) contained such a prohibition. 
Again, obviously, particularly in the case of single director companies, Article 84(2) 
needed to be amended. The David Neil case well illustrates the consequences if this was 
overlooked. In the David Neil case, the company's articles included Article 84(2). 
Accordingly, as the only director, Mr Neil, was interested, no binding quorum would ever 
have been possible. However, in the Woodware Products case, Article 84(2) was 
expressly excluded from the company's articles. Therefore, the interested director, Mr 
Saunders, could be counted in any quorum. 
A further variation was where the articles prohibited an interested director from voting, 
but were silent as to disqualification from the quorum. In the case of Re Greymouth Point 
Elizabeth Railway and Coal Company Ltd89 two directors had made advances to the 
company which was in financial difficulties. At a subsequent board meeting it was 
resolved to issue debentures to the two directors to secure their advances. At the board 
meeting only three directors were present, two being the interested directors. Later, the 
company went into receivership and the validity of the debentures were challenged. 
Farwell J noted that the articles of the company required a quorum of two directors. His 
critical finding was that a quorum of directors meant a quorum capable of voting on the 
question. Therefore there had been no quorum and no valid contract for the issue of the 
debentures. 90 
Similarly, in Re Austplat Minerals N.L.,91 the articles of a company required a quorum of 
two directors when the number of directors did not exceed three. At the relevant date 
[1904] 1 Ch 32 
Ibid at 35 
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there were only three directors who met to consider an agreement to purchase shares in 
another company. Two of the directors were interested in the transaction and abstained 
from voting. Accordingly, the resolution was "passed" by the remaining director. The 
Supreme Court of Western Australia found that the resolution was invalid:92 
" ... , a quorum at meetings of the board must be a quorum of persons competent to 
vote at the board meeting in question." 
G. Miscellaneous 
92 
93 
94 
A number of minor points of uncertainty also existed under the 1955 Act. The wording of 
s199 seemed to suggest that disclosure could only be made at a meeting of directors. 
Arguably then, disclosure by a signed resolution in the minute book would not suffice, 
despite being made in accordance with Article 106. 93 
The wording of s 199(2) seemed to suggest that disclosure only needed to be made if the 
contract was brought before the board. If the contract need not be brought before the 
board, which may well have been the case with larger companies, then arguably no 
disclosure was required. 
The relationship between Article 84(3) and s204 of the 1955 Act was never clear. In 
general terms, s204 prohibited articles or contracts making provision to exempt any 
officer of the company from liability for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of 
trust. Articles or contracts which contravened s204 were void. Whether Article 84(3) 
was included remained a moot point. Commentators argued that Article 84(3) was 
permissible: 
"as it is designed to prevent the duty arising, and does not relieve an individual 
from liability for breach of that duty. 1194 
Ibid at 722 
Which provided: 
n78 
"A resolution in writing, signed by all the directors for the time being entitled to 
receive notice of a meeting of the directors, shall be as valid and effectual as 
if it had been passed at a meeting of the directors duly convened and held. 
Any such resolution may consist of several documents in like form, each 
signed by one or more directors." 
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But there was no determinative authority on the point. As there as none on the position of 
third parties involved in a self-interested transaction. The issue being complicated by the 
provisions of ss18B and 18C of the 1955 Act. 95 
For all these reasons, the law on self-interested transactions was ripe for reform under the 
new Companies Act 1993. 
IV. SELF-JNTERESTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1993 
95 
96 
Part VIII of the Act introduces a new regime to govern self-interested transactions. The 
theme of the new legislation reflects the move away from the strict prohibitions of the 
common law to more flexible rules invoking principles of fairness and disclosure. Rather 
than effectively imposing on directors a duty not to have a conflict of interest, reflecting 
the reality of business, the Act impliedly accepts the inevitability of self-interested 
transactions and imposes duties of disclosure and concepts of fairness to the company 
instead. 
Like the rest of the Act, the new regime also reflects the move away from the United 
Kingdom company law model. Previously, New Zealand's company law statutes had 
largely been drawn from the English equivalent. 96 The new Act draws generally on North 
American corporation law statutes, particularly the Canada Business Corporations Act 
1985, the Ontario Business Corporations Act 1982 and the US Model Business 
Corporation Act 1984. However, many provisions in the new Act, and in the new regime 
to govern self-interested transactions, have no obvious equivalent in other jurisdictions. 
The new regime sets out provisions relating to four self-interest situations: 
(i) general transactions - section 140; 
(ii) use of company information - section 145; 
See n66 at 139-141 for further discussion 
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1948(UK) 
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(iii) share dealings - section 148;97 
(iv) remuneration and other benefits - section 161 
A. Meaning of Interested 
97 
98 
99 
Section 139(1) the Act defines exclusively the situations in which a director is deemed to 
be interested in a transaction. A director is interested, if and only if, the director: 
(i) is a party to the transaction; or 
(ii) will or may derive a material financial benefit from the transaction; or 
(iii) is a director, officer or trustee of another party or person who will or may derive a 
material financial benefit from the contract; 98 or 
(iv) is a parent, child or spouse of another party or person who will or may derive a 
material financial benefit from the contract; or 
(v) is otherwise directly or indirectly materially interested in the transaction. 
Two differences from the regime under the 1955 Act are immediately obvious. First, the 
new Act refers to "transactions", while the 1955 Act referred to "contracts". 99 
"Transaction" is not defined in the Act but would appear to have a wider meaning than 
"contract". Accordingly, the provisions of the Act may apply to situations less formal than 
contractual situations and/or prior to the relevant parties contracting or even proposing to 
contract with each other. Some guidance may be provided by s292(1) of the Act. That 
subsection provides a definition of "transaction" in the context of voidable transactions. 
However, it would appear that the definition is limited to only for the purposes of that 
The regime in respect to share dealings is not discussed further in this paper. 
This does not include a party or person that is the holding company where the company 
is a wholly-owned subsidiary, or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the company, or another 
wholly-owned subsidiary of the company's holding company (s139(1)(c)) . 
I. e. in s 199 and Article 84 
100 
101 
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section. 100 Secondly, apart from the rather obvious situation where a director is an actual 
party to the transaction, 101 s 13 9( 1) introduces a criteria of materiality before a director is 
interested. 102 It is not necessary that the benefit be "financial" because s 13 9(1 )( e) 
operates as a II catch-all II provision and provides that any direct or indirect material interest 
will be caught. 
It is interesting that the section attempts on exhaustive definition. Accordingly, if it can be 
shown that a transaction is not caught by the definition, the regime will not apply. 
However, given the unrestricted ambit of "transaction" and the width of s139(1)(e), it is 
difficult to think of a situation that will fall outside the definition. Necessarily then the 
emphasis will be on the terms "material financial benefit", "material financial interest" and 
"materially interested". 
Section 139(2) specifically provides that a director is deemed to be not interested if the 
transaction involves the director giving a guarantee, indemnity or security in respect of 
company business. Of course, in such a situation the director is clearly interested. 103 
However, the reality is, particularly in the case of closely held companies, the giving of a 
security by a director will be critical to the company obtaining finance. The giving of such 
a security is clearly for the benefit of the company. Presumably then, the legislature 
considered this benefit to outweigh the danger from the director's conflict of interest. 
Arguably, a director may insist that the company provide additional security than is 
commercially necessary to reduce the risk of a call on the security that the director has 
provided. 
s292(1) provides: "In this section, "transaction", in relation to a company, means ... 11 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
Section 139(1)(a) 
See Part IVB of this paper 
As in the Woodware Products case, see Part IIIB(i) of this paper. Where a director 
guarantees a company loan, and the director has to pay the company's debt, the 
director will usually have a subrogated right to recover the same from the company. 
30 
In turn, s139(2) is subject to the qualification that the lender has no "connection" with the 
otherwise interested director. Again, the term "connection" is not defined in the Act. 
Accordingly, there is uncertainty as to its ambit. A quite common situation is where a 
director will have a personal account with the company's bankers. The question arises, is 
that a situation sufficient to constitute a "connection" and therefore s139(2) does not 
apply? Only after some interesting litigation will the answer be clearer. 
B. Meaning of Material 
104 
105 
The terms "material financial benefit", "material financial interest" and "materially 
interested" are not defined in the Act. Therefore it is not clear as to exactly when a 
financial benefit, a financial interest or an interest will become "material" . It is easy to 
state that what is "material" will probably depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
individual case. But this provides little direction for affected directors. No doubt the 
experience of other jurisdictions with similarly worded statutes will be drawn on. 
In Australia, s231 (2) of the Corporations Law Act excludes any interest that "may 
properly be regarded as not being a material interest" . However, that only applies where 
the director's interest consists of being a member or creditor of a corporation interested in 
a contract with the director's company. Similarly, to the New Zealand Act, the 
Corporations Act provides no assistance in deciding what is or what is not to be properly 
regarded as a non-material interest. 104 
Ford offers that: 105 
"The materiality of the interest of a member or creditor could depend on various 
factors in the particular circumstances including the relative size of the holding or 
debt and any special rights enjoyed." 
However, it is not unknown for a statute to define "material", at least in part. Section 
97 of the Companies Act 1981 in Burmuda provides that an interest is not deemed 
material where ownership or direct or indirect control of the contracting party amounts 
to less than 10 per cent of its capital. See Taking Responsibility, An International 
Guide To Directors Duties and Liabilities, International Financial Law Review, April 
1992at8. 
HA J Ford & RP Austin Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (6th ed) 
Butterworths, 1992, Sydney at 497 
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In Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd106 the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales said that the word "materially" imports "an element of judgment and opinion which 
could be productive of uncertainty as to the obligations of the opponents in dispute, ... "107 
Thus little of certainty can be taken from the Australian experience. 
In Canada, sl20(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act refers to "material 
contracts" and "material interests" .108 Again, no assistance is provided as to what is 
meant by "material" . Welling109 opines that the meaning of what is material is 
conditioned by the purpose behind the section. And the purpose of the section is to 
identify those contracts or interests in which a director's ability to bargain effectively on 
behalf of the company may be inhibited. The test is, if disclosure of the interest had been 
made, would it be relevant to the board's decision whether to allow the director to 
continue with the other party? Welling suggests that, before this can occur, relying on the 
Privy Council decision in Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Ltd, l lO the director's 
declaration: 
" ... must make his colleagues "fully informed of the real state of things" [ ] If it 
is material to their judgment that they should know not merely that he has an 
interest, but what it is and how far it goes, then he must see to it that they are 
informed." 
Of course this represents a return to what is very close to the fiduciary standard of full and 
frank disclosure of all material facts.111 And the writer doubts whether the New Zealand 
courts would go that far. 
(1986) 10 ACLR 327 
Ibid at 331 
See Part VIIA of this paper 
B L Welling Corporate Law in Canada (2nd ed) Butterworths, 1991, Toronto at 452 
[1952] 3 DLR 1 at 14 
n79 at 168 
32 
In the United States, the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations stipulates that disclosure must be of the known material 
facts relating to the conflict of interest and the transaction. A fact is material if there is "a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important under the 
circumstances in determining the person's course of action. 11112 
Until the New Zealand courts have grappled with this issue and laid down some 
guidelines, the prudent advice to interested directors may well be: if in doubt, disclose. 
C. Disclosure 
112 
113 
114 
Section 140 provides a statutory duty of disclosure. Subsection (1) requires a director, 
who is interested in a transaction or a proposed transaction, to record his or her interest in 
the aptly named "interests register". 113 If the company has more than one director, the 
interested director must also disclose the interest to the board. Unlike the entry in the 
interests register, there is no requirement that disclosure to the board must be in writing. 
So it would seem that an oral declaration will suffice with the obvious enforcement 
difficulties. 114 However, the entry in the interests register (and disclosure) must be made 
"forthwith". 
It is implicit in the drafting of the section that the director must be aware of the fact that 
he or she is interested in the transaction. Presumably then it will be a defence to any 
action, pursuant to s 140, if the interested director can show that he or she was simply 
unaware of the conflict. 
Proposed Final Draft at 1.25 
See Part IVD of this paper 
sl40(4) 
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The nature of the monetary value of the director's interest must be entered in the interests 
register115 or if the value of the interest cannot be qualified, the nature and the extent of 
the interest. 116 For good practical reasons, a general notice may be entered in the 
interests register or disclosed to the board in situations where there may be an ongoing 
conflict. 117 There is an interesting difference in the wording of sl40(1) compared with 
sl40(2) which the writer doubts was intended. Under sl40(1) disclosure must be made 
by entry in the interests register, and, if the company has more than one director, 
disclosure to the board. However, sl40(2) provides that a general notice entered in the 
interests register Q[ disclosure to the board is a sufficient disclosure. If the option is taken 
to make disclosure to the board ( and it can be done orally) then this would appear to 
circumvent disclosure to the shareholders? 
Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of sl40(1) does not affect the validity 
of the transaction entered into.118 However, failure to comply by a director constitutes an 
offence under the Act, punishable by a fine ofup to $10,000. 119 
D. The Interests Register 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
The Law Commission in its Report No. 9 identified that, in the case of self-interested 
transactions: 120 
"the case law has proved too strict and has been modified by articles and statute 
with results which are unsatisfactory; . . . The draft Act: 
sl40(l)(a) 
sl40(1 )(b) 
sl40(2) 
sl40(3) 
requires self-interested transactions to be disclosed to shareholders and to 
be fair to the company;" 
sl40( 4). Cf sl99(4) of the 1955 Act. 
Law Commission, Report No. 9 Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9), 
GP Publications Ltd, 1989, Wellington at para. 193 . 
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With that aim it appears that it is intended that the interests register will be the central 
mechanism in the administration of the affairs of the company to prevent directors from 
abusing their knowledge and powers for their own benefit. The concept of an interests 
register is new and, from the writer's researches, without parallel in other jurisdictions. 121 
Although it could be argued that sl95A of the 1955 Act122 was some kind of precedent. 
However, for all its apparent importance, the interests register is an elusive creature as 
provided for in the Act. Unlike s87 of the Act which requires a company to maintain a 
share register, there is no equivalent provision requiring the company to maintain an 
interests register. It may be that, the drafters of the new Act considered that while a 
company must have at least one share (slO(b)), there is no compulsion on directors to be 
interested. However, other provisions in the Act effectively require the compulsory 
maintenance of an interests register. 
The company must keep an interests register at its registered office or, alternatively, at 
some other place in New Zealand upon notice to the Registrar. 123 As such the interests 
register forms part of the company's records. As part of the company's records the 
interest register must be kept in written form, 124 or in a form or manner that allows the 
information that comprises the record to be easily accessible and convertible into written 
form. 125 And, the board of the company must ensure that adequate measures exist to 
prevent the interests register being falsified. 126 
The interests register must be kept available for inspection by directors and shareholders. 
Section 191 provides a procedure whereby directors may inspect the records of the 
company including the interests register. The company must make the interests register 
In Australia, the maintenance of an interests register is part of a range of proposed 
reforms to the Corporations Law Act by the Companies and Securities Advisory 
Committee. Although the Committee's proposals for reform were published in 
July 1991, to date, they have not been made law. 
Which provided that every company shall keep a register of officers' shareholdings. 
sl89(l)(c) and sl89(3) 
sl90(l)(a) 
sl90(l)(b) - an obvious reference to computer records 
sl90 
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available for inspection by any shareholder of the company. Sections 216, 217 and 218 of 
the Act set out the procedure. Particulars of entries in the interests register must be 
included in the contents of the company's annual report.127 
The introduction of the concept of an interests register can be seen to have two particular 
improvements over the regime under the 1955 Act. First, disclosure must be in writing 
with the obvious publication and enforcement advantages. Secondly, it provides a 
mechanism whereby disclosure is made to the company as a whole, not just to the board, 
but without the need to call a general meeting. 
E. Avoidance 
127 
128 
129 
As indicated earlier, failure by an interested director to make disclosure does not, in itself, 
affect the validity of a transaction already entered into. 128 However, unless the company's 
constitution specifically provides for the avoidance of transactions in which a director is 
interested, the transaction can illlly. be avoided in accordance with s 141 . 129 Section 
141(1) empowers the company with the right to avoid any self-interested transaction. 
However, this power expires three months after the transaction is disclosed to all the 
shareholders (whether by means of the company's annual report or otherwise). 
Presumably an expiry period has been provided for in the interests of certainty of the 
transaction. But a difficulty may well be that the three month period does not commence 
until after disclosure is made to all the shareholders. What if one shareholder is holidaying 
overseas at the time and does not read the annual report, and therefore disclosure is not 
effected, until some time later? Is the fact that the annual report was sent to the 
shareholder's latest known address in accordance with ss87(2)(a) and 209 of the Act 
sufficient? 
Section 141(1) specifically provides that disclosure may be made otherwise than by the 
company's annual report. If made at a general meeting of shareholders, care would need 
to be taken that all shareholders were present. In the circumstances, if the transaction is 
of sufficient importance, it may be prudent to arrange for personal service of the 
disclosure document on each and all of the shareholders. 
s21 l(l)(e) 
s140(3) 
sl41(6) But see Part IVE 2 of this paper 
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It will be noted that s 141 does not convey any statutory right on the company to recover 
any profits made by an interested director. The only statutory right is avoidance of the 
transaction. Whether the company may provide for such a remedy in its constitution is a 
moot point. All that can be said with certainty is that the Act's silence on the point was 
deliberate. One of the model statutes, the Ontario Business Corporations Act, specifically 
covers the point. Section 132 of that Act provides that if the conflict of interest 
transaction is not rendered non-voidable, the director is accountable to the corporation for 
any profit unless the transaction was reasonable and fair to the corporation. 
1. Fair Value 
It will be recalled that at common law the fairness of the transaction was irrelevant. 130 
However, under the new Act it is the central concept. Avoidance is only possible if the 
company did not receive "fair value" for the transaction and there is a presumption, which 
can be rebutted, 131 that transactions entered into in the ordinary course of the company's 
business and on usual terms and conditions are fair. 132 "Fair value" is to be determined on 
the basis of the information known to the company and the interested director at the time 
the transaction was entered into.133 Accordingly, no element of hindsight is allowed. 
For the purposes of sl41, the person seeking to uphold the transaction and who knew or 
ought to have known of the director's interest at the time the transaction was entered into 
has the onus of establishing "fair value" .134 Otherwise, the onus of establishing that the 
company did not receive fair value is on the company. 135 
It would appear that the drafters of the Act were under no illusion as to the difficulty of 
interpreting the meaning of "fair value" . 
See Part II A of this paper 
sl41(5) 
sl41(4) 
sl 41(3) 
sl41(5)(a) 
sl41(5)(b) 
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"The concept of "fair value" will, if and when litigation is pursued provide mental 
exercise for expert witnesses and judges, but is not at all easy to define in advance. 
It was intended and may be expected to encourage corporate players and their 
advisers to err on the side of caution if any particular arrangement could be said to 
provide less than "fair value" to the party ( often the company itself) with whom the 
director is dealing. 136 
Section 141 follows similar North American proV1s1ons (e.g. Ontario Business 
Corporations Act 1982, s132(7), Canada Business Corporations Act 1985, sl20(7), US 
Model Business Corporation Act 1984, s8.3 l). Accordingly, North American authorities 
should be of particular assistance in interpreting the section. 137 
2. Section 141(6) 
Section 141 ( 6) is a difficult provision. On a broad interpretation, it provides the company 
with the power to effectively contract out of the Act's regime. For example, the company 
may chose to provide in its constitution that a self-interested transaction is not liable to be 
avoided.138 But, on a narrow interpretation, coupled with sl6(2) of the Act, it merely 
provides that the constitution may limit the company's powers of avoidance under the Act. 
For example, the 3 month period provided for in sl41(1) may be limited to 2 months. 
The writer believes that the narrow interpretation will prove to be the correct one. It is 
implicit from the wording of s141(6) that the avoidance regime cannot, to coin a phrase, 
be avoided. 
F. Third Parties 
Avoidance of transactions necessarily raises issues of the effect on third parties. Section 
142 provides that, if a transaction is avoided under s141, this will not affect the title or 
interest of a person in or to property which that person has acquired if the property was 
acquired: 
J Hodder, NZLS Seminar, Company Law 1 - Getting Started at 50. 
See Part VIIB of this paper. 
Similar to Article 84(3) of Table A. 
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(i) from a person other than the company; and 
(ii) for valuable consideration; and 
(iii) without knowledge of the circumstances of the transaction under which the 
property was acquired from the company. 
The wording of sl42 seems to suggest that if the transaction was avoided in accordance 
with the company's constitution, as permitted by sl41(6), then sl42 does not apply. It is 
doubted that this was intended. 
What also is not clear is what remedy the company has if it does not receive "fair value" 
under the transaction but it cannot avoid the transaction because of its effect on a third 
party. Does the company still have some general right of damages against the interested 
director? 
G. Voting 
Section 144 of the Act completely reverses the common law position as to voting. 
Subject to the constitution of the company, an interested director may vote, attend 
meetings, sign documents and generally do any other thing as if he or she was not 
interested in the transaction. 
H. Enforcement 
Failure to comply with the Act's provisions relating to self-interested transaction exposes a 
director to a raft of possible enforcement actions: 
(i) failure to make an entry in the interests register ( and disclosure) is an offence 
under the Act (sl40(4)). Upon conviction the director is liable to a fine up to 
$10,000; 
(ii) section 169(3) provides that the duty to disclose interests ( s 140) and the duty to 
disclose share dealings (sl48) are duties owed to the shareholders; 
(iii) section 169(3)(i) provides that the duty relating to the use of company information 
(sl45) is a duty owed to the company; 
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(iv) a breach of the general duty to act in accordance with the Act (s134); 
( v) the transaction may be avoided unless the company received fair value for it 
(s141(1)); 
(vi) personal liability for an unauthorised payment (s161(5)); 
( vii) liability to repay an unauthorised loan ( s 161 ( 6) ); 
( viii) failure to keep the interests register at the registered office of the company or 
otherwise notified place is an offence under the Act (s189(5)) . Upon conviction 
the director is liable to a fine up to $10, OOO. 
V. USE OF COMP ANY INFORMATION 
139 
140 
A. The Common Law Position 
A corollary of the common law rule that directors, as fiduciaries, must not place 
themselves in a situation of conflict of interest, is that directors must not use a company's 
assets, opportunities or information for their own profit. If a director does so, then the 
company is entitled to an account of those profits. 
In the case of small family owned companies and the use of company assets, abuse of this 
rule is probably epidemic.139 With such companies enforcement of the rule is difficult and 
often uneconomic from a commercial point of view. But in the case of larger companies 
and the misuse of company information or a company opportunity a substantial body of 
common law authority has built up. 
The leading case is the House of Lords decision in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver. 140 
The facts are somewhat complicated but can be summarised as follows . Regal (Hastings) 
Ltd ("Regal") owned a cinema. The directors of Regal, with a view to the future 
A conclusion based on anecdotal evidence only but few would doubt it. 
[1942] 1 All ER 378, [1967] 2 AC 134. Thejudgment was delivered in 1942 but 
for some reason was not reported in The Law Reports until 1967. 
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development or sale of the company, wished to acquire the lease of the two other cinemas. 
For this purpose, they formed a second company named Hastings Amalgamated Cinemas 
Ltd ("Amalgamated"). Amalgamated was registered with a capital of £5000 in £1 shares. 
The directors of Amalgamated were the same persons as the directors of Regal, except for 
one other person. 
A difficulty arose because the lessor of the two cinemas insisted on a personal guarantee 
from the directors of Amalgamated unless the paid up capital of Amalgamated was at least 
£5000. The directors were not prepared to give guarantees so the venture appeared to 
flounder. A meeting of the directors of the two companies was held (without it being 
clear at any particular moment for which company a particular director was appearing) to 
discuss the matter further. As an alternative plan, it as resolved to subscribe the 5000 
shares in Amalgamated. Regal took 2000 shares, being all that it could afford, and the 
directors took the remaining 3000. Accordingly, the lease was approved. 
Subsequently all the shares in both companies were sold for a substantial profit. Later 
again, Regal, under its new owners, brought an action against the former directors to 
recover the profit made. There was no argument before the House of Lords that the 
former directors had not acted in good faith and with the interests of Regal in rnind. 141 
However, the House of Lords found against them. Applying the classic trust case of 
Keech v Sandford, 142 Lord Russell said: 143 
"The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make 
a profit, being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or 
absence of bona tides; or upon such questions or considerations as whether the 
profit would or should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the 
profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of the profit for the plaintiff, or 
whether he took a risk or acted as he did for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether 
the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefited by his action. The liability arises 
from the mere fact of a profit having, in the stated circumstances, been made. The 
profiteer, however honest and well-intentioned, cannot escape the risk of being 
called upon to account" 
Ibid at 143 
n4 
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The issue was simply one of fact and the company need but show two things: 
(i) that what the directors did was so related to the affairs of the company that it can 
properly be said to have been done in the course of their management and in 
utilisation of their opportunities and special knowledge as directors; and 
(ii) that what they did resulted in a profit to themselves.144 
It will be observed that the result in the Regal (Hastings) Ltd case was quite undeserved. 
There was no evidence before the House of Lords that there had been any deceit in 
respect of the price paid by the new owners for the shares. Therefore, the result of the 
House of Lords' decision was to give the new owners II an unexpected windfall.11145 
Furthermore, as the "interested" directors had owned a majority of the shares in Regal, 
they could, if they had wished, have protected themselves by having their action ratified by 
the company in general meeting. But, at the time, this had simply not occurred to them. 
Nor could it be said, in the true sense, that the directors had used the company's property 
or information, or had deprived it of an opportunity. On the facts of the case Regal could 
never have availed itself of the opportunity to acquire the further 3000 shares. 
This is not to say that the Courts were not immune to the possible inequities of the 
common law rule that the Regal (Hastings) Ltd case illustrated. But the rule was thought 
to be too important for that. Lord Porter said:146 
" ... the principle that a person occupying a fiduciary relationship shall not make a 
profit by reason thereof is of such vital importance that the possible consequence 
in the present case is in fact as it is in law an immaterial consideration." 
A classic corporate opportunity case is Cook v Deeks.147 In this case a construction 
company began negotiations to obtain a railway contract. However, three of the 
company's four directors obtained the contract in their own names excluding the fourth . 
Ibid at 153 
Ibid at 157 
Ibid 
[1916] 1 AC 554 
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Not surprisingly the fourth director sued. The Privy Council found that the benefit of the 
contract belonged in equity to the company and ought to have been dealt with as an asset 
of the company. 148 Similarly, in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v O'Malley, 149 the Canadian 
Supreme Court found that the president and executive vice president of the company ( as 
such senior officers) owed fiduciary duties to the company similar to those owed by 
directors. Accordingly, they were held liable to account to the company, having 
participated in negotiations on behalf of the company, then resigned, formed a new 
company and acquired the contract for their new company. 
B. The Companies Act 1993 
Like the Act's general provisions in respect to self-interested transactions, s145 of the Act 
considerably reforms the common law as it applies to the use of company information. 
However, s145 maintains the basic obligation to maintain confidential information in 
confidence. In particular, a director must not disclose, make use of or act on information 
which he or she has in his or her capacity as a director or employee of the company.150 
Three immediate points about s145 should be noted. First, the section does not 
specifically refer to the position of company property. While clearly company information 
is company property, obviously not all company property is information. Accordingly, it 
would seem that misuse of company property, for example, use of company equipment for 
private use, would be a breach of s 131 151 of the Act rather than s 145. Secondly, the 
definition of director in s126 of the Act is expanded for the purposes of s145 152 to include 
a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions a director ( as defined) may 
be required or is accustomed to act. 153 Thirdly, it would appear that use of company 
information may not be the subject of an unanimous agreement, see Part VIC of this 
paper. 
Ibid at 564 
[1973] 40 DLR (3rd) 371 
s145(1) 
Which provides for a duty of directors to act in good faith and in the best interests of 
the company. 
And for the purposes of ss 146-149 inclusive of the Act. 
s126(1)(d) 
154 
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Company information to be caught by sl45 is information held by the director in his or her 
capacity as a director or employee of the company. The information must not otherwise 
be available to the director. Accordingly, sl45 does not include information which comes 
to a director in a non-directorial or private capacity. The distinction was important in 
Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper. 154 In this case, the company, Peso, was offered the 
opportunity to acquire various mining claims. However, at the time, Peso's financial 
resources were strained and the offer was rejected. The defendant, Cropper, was 
executive vice president and a director of Peso and a member of the board that made the 
decision to reject the offer. Later, Cropper, along with others, purchased the claims and 
formed two new companies, one to take over the claims and the other to develop them. 
Cropper's connection with the other mining companies caused "unfiiendliness" 155 between 
him and the other directors of Peso. Eventually he was dismissed and required to resign 
as a director. Peso sued claiming Cropper was accountable to Peso for his shares in the 
new companies. On the facts of the case there was a crucial finding (not contested) that 
the original decision by Cropper and the other members of the board of Peso to reject the 
offer had been in good faith and in the best interests of the company. But importantly 
here, the Canadian Supreme Court found that Cropper was subsequently approached as a 
potential purchaser of the claims, not in his capacity as a director of Peso but, as an 
individual member of the public.156 Accordingly, Peso's claim was dismissed. 
Section 145(1) provides four exceptions to the prima facie rule. A director may disclose, 
make use of or act on company information: 
1) for the purposes of the company; 
2) as required by law; 
3) in accordance with sl45(2) and (3); 
4) in compliance with sl40. 
[1966] 58 DLR (2d) 1 
Ibid at 5 
Ibid at 8 
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159 
44 
Of the above, 1) and 2) are self-explanatory and 4) is dealt with elsewhere in this 
paper. 157 But section 145(2) and (3) require further comment. 
C. Section 145(2) - Necessary Information 
Section 145(2) provides for the situation of nominee directors recognising the reality that 
such directors are expected to pass information on to the appointing shareholder. In its 
Report No. 9, the Law Commission explained the policy behind sl45(2) as:158 
"This is an attempt to make the position of the nominee a more open one. It does 
not mean, of course, that the nominating shareholder is entitled to use the 
information for his or her own benefit: the nominating shareholder in such 
circumstances will be treated as a director for the purposes of use of the 
information ... " 
Accordingly, unless prohibited by the board, sl45(2) permits a nommee director to 
disclose information to his or her appointer provided that the name of the appointor is 
entered in the interests register. 159 
D. Section 145(3) - Procedure for disclosure, use etc 
Section 145(3) provides that a director may disclose, make use of or act on company 
information if: 
1) particulars of the disclosure, use or act in question are entered in the interests 
register; and 
2) the director is first authorised to do so by the board; and 
3) the company will not be or is not likely to be prejudiced. 
See Part IVC of this paper 
Law Commission, Report No. 9 Company Law Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9) 
Publications Ltd, 1989, Wellington at para. 536. 
See Part IVD of this paper. 
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It would seem from 2) above that the board must give priQ[ authority, otherwise, the 
director will technically be in breach of s145 . But there is no requirement that the 
authority must be given in writing (unlike the entry in the interests register) and, in the 
context of single director companies, one could wonder at the relevance of such a 
procedure. 
Jones160 comments that s145(3) is an attempt to provide a "safe harbour" for transactions 
which, in the absence of s145(3), would be subject to the rigours of the common law 
requiring an account of profits. However, the "safe harbour" is undermined by the 
requirement that the disclosure or use of the company information not prejudice the 
company. Prior approval of the board should suffice because considerations of prejudice 
to the company should be considered by the board before its authority is given. 
Otherwise, the disclosure or use of company information may be subject to a subsequent 
argument that it prejudiced the company. In the circumstances, if the only safe course is 
to make disclosure to the company in general meeting, the usefulness of s145(3) is 
limited. Jones further questions that, if s145(3) is seen as a code, there may be some 
doubt whether the approval of the company in general meeting would provide sufficient 
authority for the director to take up the corporate opportunity as it would at common 
law.161 However, he subscribes to the view, as does the writer, that the approval of the 
company will continue to provide sufficient authority to a director to take up a corporate 
opportunity, s145(3) being seen as a procedural section only designed with administrative 
efficiency in mind.162 
As to the requirement that the disclosure or use of the company information not prejudice 
the company, at least it introduces an element of objectivity into the exercise. As the point 
has been made many times, in the context of small closely held companies, authority from 
the board is of dubious utility. At first blush, sl45 appears to be somewhat of a toothless 
monster. There is no offence provision for non-compliance with s145 .163 Nor is there a 
provision requiring a director in breach of the section to account to the company for any 
profits made. However, under s169(3)(i) of the Act, s145 constitutes a duty owed to the 
company and therefore the company may sue the director for any breach. No doubt any 
such action would include a claim for any profits made. Further, any such breach could be 
n3 at 119 
Ibid 
Ibid 
c.f s140(4) 
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the subject ofa derivative action by the shareholders under ssl64, 165, 170 or 172 of the 
Act. 
VI. SECTIONS 161 AND 162-A SEPARATE REGIME 
164 
165 
166 
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Remuneration and other benefits paid to directors have always been of interest to the 
shareholders and creditors of the company. Reflecting a climate of concern, under the 
1955 Act, loans to directors of public companies were prohibited.164 And, at common 
law, any remuneration payable to directors was strictly limited to any express relaxation of 
the equitable rule contained in the articles of the company.165 Typically, the articles 
required that the remuneration of directors be determined by the shareholders in general 
meeting. 
In contrast, s 161 of the Act adopts an enabling approach and applies a separate regime in 
respect to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
payments of remuneration or the provision of other benefits for services as a 
director or in any other capacity; 166 
payments of compensation for loss of office; 167 
loans to directors· 168 
' 
the giving of guarantees for debts incurred by directors; 169 
ssl90(1), 354(4) and 9th Schedule. Although, one might have thought that, in the case of 
closely held companies, the risk was just as great, if not greater. 
E.g. Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 at 692 
sl6l(l)(a). Presumably the words "for services ... in any other capacity" are designed to 
catch payments made to directors designated to be payments to the director as a 
employee of the company. 
sl61(1)(b) 
s161(1 )( c) 
sl61(1 )( d) 
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• contracts to do any of the above. 170 
The regime is separate because s143 of the Act provides that the general provisions 
relating to self-interested transactions ( ss 140 and 141) do not apply to : 
• remuneration or any other benefit given to a director in accordance with s 161; or 
• an indemnity given or insurance provided in accordance with s 162. 
It should be noted that the phrase "in accordance with" is critical to the separate operation 
of the two sections. Otherwise, the arrangement will be subject to ss140 and 141 and 
therefore the requirements of disclosure, 171 avoidance172 and penalty.173 
A. Authorisation Procedure 
As a general rule, s 161 empowers the board to authorise payments of remuneration and 
other benefits, provided the board is satisfied that the transaction is fair to the 
company. 174 However, this statutory authority is subject to any "restrictions" contained 
in the constitution of the company. By the use of the word "restrictions" it would see that 
the constitution may include additional procedures or perhaps limits on the quantum of 
remuneration or benefits. But the Act does not appear to allow the constitution to contain 
a different authorisation process. In other words, the wording of the Act mandates that it 
is the board's responsibility to authorise such payments, not the company's. 175 
s16l(l)(e) 
s140(1) 
s141(1) 
s140(4) 
s161(1) 
s161(1) does not provide "Subject to the constitution of a company ... " Cf s160. 
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The only criteria that the board must consider is whether the transaction is "fair" 176 to the 
company. To that extent the rule in sl61 can be seen as a more relaxed one. But what is 
fair to the company is a loose subjective concept. Reflecting this, traditionally, the Courts 
have been reluctant to interfere in the area of directors' remuneration." "[I]t is not for the 
Court to manage the company". 177 
However, under s161, "fairness" is the only relevant criteria and necessarily it will 
eventually fall to the Courts to determine some guidelines. 178 
After authorising the remuneration or other benefit, the board (not the director) must 
ensure that the particulars of the transaction are entered in the interests register. 179 
Further, the directors who voted in favour of the transaction must certify that the 
transaction is fair to the company and give grounds for their opinion. 180 
Section 161(3) provides that it is not necessary to obtain a separate authorisation for each 
transaction in accordance with a contract which has already been authorised under 
s161(1)(e). Obviously, in a situation of regular ongoing payments, for example, payments 
for services to the company, it should not be necessary to have to continually seek the 
board's approval. 
B. Unauthorised Benefits 
If the transaction has not been authorised in terms of s 161 ( 1 ), or the transaction has not 
been certified in terms of s161(4), or there are not reasonable grounds for the directors' 
opinion set out in the certificate, a director is personally liable for the amount of the 
payment or the value of the benefit. 181 In the case of a loan, it becomes immediately 
Cf the requirement of "fair value" in s 141 . 
Re Halt Garage Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 at 1039. A case where the liquidator of the 
company brought proceedings against husband and wife directors claiming that their 
remuneration exceeded the market value of their services. 
See Part VIlB of this paper 
See Part IVD of this paper 
s161(4) 
s161(5) 
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repayable to the company, notwithstanding its terms.182 
The above is, however, subject to the proviso that, to the extent that the director can 
show that the transaction was in fact fair to the company, the director will not be liable. 
Accordingly, for example, if the director can only show that 80% of the payment was fair 
to the company, the director will only have to account for the remaining 20%. In this 
context of directors' remuneration, ss297 and 298 of the Act should also be noted. 
C. Unanimous Agreements 
The Companies Act 1993 imposes a multitude of formality requirements on companies. 
As well as the requirements associated with self-interested transactions, there are similarly 
complex regimes relating to the issue of shares, distributions to shareholders, share 
repurchases, amalgamations, financial assistance and so on. 
In the case of closely held companies, where often the shareholders and the directors are 
the same persons ( or person), such requirements, designed to ensure managerial 
accountability, are largely superfluous. Furthermore, such requirements involve the 
completion of relatively complex documentation which, in the context of such companies, 
is unwarranted and unduly expensive. 
Section 107 of the Act is recognition of the inappropriateness of such complex formality 
requirements for closely held companies. The section provides that, if all entitled 
persons183 agree, various transactions can be carried out by the company otherwise than 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such an unanimous agreement must be 
recorded in writing. 184 
Self-interested transactions are included among the transactions that may be the subject of 
an unanimous agreement. Prima facie, s107(3) of the Act provides that, if all entitled 
persons agree, nothing in ss 140 and 141 of the Act shall apply to what would otherwise be 
a self-interested transaction. In the case of many closely held companies there will be only 
sl61(6) 
As defined in section 2 
Section 107 ( 4) 
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one entitled person. Accordingly, that person (as shareholder) can authorise the company 
to enter into a transaction with him or herself (as director). As a result the provisions 
relating to disclosure, avoidance and penalties can be avoided. This is no further criteria. 
But the operation of s107(3) very much depends on the nature of the transaction 
concerned. If the transaction falls within s161(1) (remuneration and other benefits) 
s107(3) does not apply. Instead the transaction is caught by sl 70(1)(£) of the Act. Such a 
transaction may be exercised under an unanimous agreement. However, under s 108(1) of 
the Act, it is also subject to the solvency test. 185 
Section 170(1)(£) is a somewhat curious provision. On the one hand, that the solvency 
test should apply to such transactions is logical. Payments of remuneration or other 
benefits to directors are equally able to undermine the position of creditors of the 
company as, for example, the payment of a dividend 186 or redemptions.187 But, on the 
other hand, s170(1)(f) flies in the face of the policy behind allowing unanimous 
agreements. In the circumstances, the added obligation of certifying that the transaction 
satisfies the solvency test188 may dissuade companies from using the unanimous 
agreement mechanism. Directors, in the case of a payment of remuneration under s 161 , 
may well prefer the lesser standard of fairness 189 and entry in the interests register190 
rather than involving the solvency test. Or, alternatively again, may choose to structure 
the transaction so that it falls outside the definition of s 161. Accordingly, such a 
transaction would then only be subject to the general regime provided by ss 140 and 141 
and exercisable under unanimous agreement without the spectre of the solvency test. 191 
Short of unanimous agreement, there appears to be no reason in principle why the 
company could not "approve" a voidable transaction by ordinary resolution (sl05(2)) . 
s4 
sl 70(l)(a) 
sl70(1)(d) 
s108(2) 
sl61(1) 
sl61(2) 
s107(3) 
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However, if the transaction qualified as a major transaction (sl29), approval by special 
resolution would be required (ss2 and 106). In the event of a disgruntled minority, 
sl41(2) would remain the key provision, i.e. a transaction cannot be avoided if the 
company receives fair value under it. 
VIl. THE MODEL JURISDICTIONS 
192 
193 
194 
The Act's regime to regulate self-interested transactions was derived from similar 
Canadian and United States provisions. In particular, the Canada Business Corporations 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 ("CBCA"), the Ontario Business Corporations Act, S.O. 1982, 
C.4, as am ("OBCA") and the United States Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
1984 ("MBCA"). Accordingly, further analysis of these model statutes should assist in 
our understanding of the Act's new regime. 
A. Canada 
Section 120 of the CBCA192 provides the Canadian regune for self-interested 
transactions. In the main, the CBCA has been adopted by the Canadian provinces 
although there are variations, for example, the OBCA. 
1. What Conflicts Must Be Disclosed 
Section 120(1) of the CBCA deals with three types of conflict of interest situations. The 
first type is when a director or officer of the corporation is involved as a party to a 
material contract or proposed material contract with the corporation. 193 Accordingly non 
material contracts are not caught. The New Zealand equivalent is s139(1)(a) of the Act. 
Although it will noted that the CBCA refers to "contracts" as did the 1955 Act rather than 
"transactions" .194 
The second type is when a director or officer of the corporation is a director or an officer 
of any person who is a party to a material contract or proposed material contract with the 
See Appendix 1 of this paper 
s120(l)(a) 
However, sl32 of the OBCA refers to "contracts" or "transactions" 
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corporation. 195 Again, non-material contracts are not caught. The New Zealand 
equivalent is s 13 9( 1 )( c) of the Act. 
The third type involves situations where a director or officer of the corporation has a 
material interest in any person who is a party to a transaction with the corporation. 196 
This time non-material interests are not caught. The New Zealand equivalent is 
s139(l)(b) and (e) of the Act. 
Obviously whether or not the contract or interest is "material" is critical. However, 
similarly to the New Zealand Act the CBCA provides no assistance as to what is meant by 
"material" .197 
2. Disclosure 
Section 120(1) of the CBCA requires that disclosure must be made in writing to the 
corporation or entered in the minutes of a meeting of directors. The nature and the extent 
of the interest must be disclosed. 
There is no equivalent to the interests register. Accordingly, if the interested director 
chooses to make disclosure by an entry in the minutes of a meeting of directors, disclosure 
is effectively confined to the board. 198 But, unlike the New Zealand equivalent, 199 oral 
disclosure is not permitted. 
Not all material facts need to be disclosed to ensure compliance with the CBCA. An 
interested director needs only to disclose "the nature and extent of his interest". The New 
I.e. sl29(1): 
A director or officer of a corporation who 
(b) is a director or an officer of .. . any person who is a party to a material 
contract or proposed material contract with the corporation 
sl29(l)(b) 
See Part IVB of this paper 
There being no requirement in the CBCA ( or the New Zealand Act for that matter) 
that the minutes of all meetings of directors be made available to the shareholders. 
There is no requirement that disclosure to the board under sl40(1) of the Act must be 
in writing. 
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Zealand Act has adopted this requirement200 but only if the monetary value of the 
director's interest cannot be quantified. 201 
Further details of disclosure are exclusively set out in sl20(2), (3), (4) and (6) of the 
CBCA. The most important is s 120( 6) which allows for continuing disclosure of potential 
conflicts. There are obvious similarities in the wording of sl40(2) of the New Zealand 
Act. 
Section 120(4) provides for 11 routine11202 contracts that would in the ordinary course of 
the corporation's business not go before the board. In such a case the nature and extent of 
the interest must be disclosed in writing to the corporation or entered in the minutes of the 
next meeting of directors, "forthwith" after the director of officer becomes aware of the 
contract or proposed contract. Any other type of contract must be disclosed under 
s120(2), in the case of directors, or under s120(3), in the case of officers. There are no 
equivalent provisions in the New Zealand Act. 
3. Approval of Voidable Contracts 
If the conflict of interest has been disclosed in accordance with s120(1), (2) (3) or (4), the 
next requirement is to get the otherwise voidable contract "approved". Section 120(7) 
provides that a contract will not be void or voidable if the board of directors or the 
shareholders "approve" the contract. 
No criteria as to what is required for such approval is specified. Presumably a special 
resolution is not necessary. In the case of approval by the board, s120(5) provides that 
the interested director must not vote. But there is no restriction on the interested director 
voting as a shareholder,203 if the shareholders are to approve the contract. Nevertheless, 
s120(7) provides for a simple mechanism for approval of contracts. It is interesting that 
the drafters of the New Zealand Act chose not to adopt an equivalent procedure. 
s140(1)(b) 
s140(1)(a) 
nl09 at 445 
Assuming, of course, the director is a shareholder. 
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Although, the proV1s1ons on unarumous agreements can be seen to have some 
similarities. 204 
4. Reasonable and Fair 
In addition to disclosure and approval, the overriding criteria provided by s 120(7) is that 
the contract must be "reasonable and fair to the corporation at the time it was approved". 
Accordingly, approval of an unreasonable or unfair contract to the corporation would be 
ineffective and the contract would remain voidable. 
The equivalent provision in the OBCA is slightly different. Section 132 of the OBCA 
provides alternative procedures for rendering contracts non-voidable. Section 132(7) of 
the OBCA operates similarly to sl20(7) of the CBCA. But, in addition, s132(8) provides 
that, where disclosure to the corporation has not occurred, a reasonable and fair contract 
may be rendered non-voidable by a special resolution of shareholders called for that 
purpose. 
There does not appear to be any Canadian authority which discusses the "reasonable and 
fair" requirement in the Canadian statutes. 205 Perhaps all that can be safely said is that the 
test is surely a objective one. But the New Zealand criteria of "fair value" under sl41 of 
the Act is quite different. "Fair value" is to be determined on the basis of the information 
known to the company and to the interested director at the time the transaction is entered 
into. 206 This suggests a subjective test. What information should have been reasonably 
known is irrelevant. 
5. The Effect of Non-Disclosure 
Failure to disclose a conflict of interest is an offence under s25 l of the CBCA. 207 More 
significantly, failure to disclose leaves a contract liable to be avoided by the corporation at 
See Part VIC of this paper 
But there is American authority, see Part VIIB of this paper. 
sl41(3) 
Section 251 of the CBCA provides: 
"Every person who, without reasonable cause, contravenes a provision of 
this Act or the regulations for which no punishment is provided is guilty of 
an offence punishable on summary conviction." 
208 
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any time. Unlike in the New Zealand Act,208 no time limit is provided. Under s120(8) 
the corporation or a shareholder may apply to the court to set aside a material contract in 
the event that a director or officer has not made disclosure. The court can set aside the 
contract on such terms as it thinks fit. 
Section 120(8) is a somewhat oddball provision. While s120(7) has three avoidance 
standards, disclosure, approval and fairness, there is no equivalent to sl20(8) in respect of 
a failure to obtain "approval" or if the contract is not reasonable or fair. 
It is interesting that the Canadian legislature should have regarded non-disclosure as 
worthy of a separate subsection. The drafters of the New Zealand Act thought the 
opposite. Section 140(3) of the Act specifically provides that failure to disclose does not 
affect the validity of a self-interested transaction. 
B. United States of America 
As in the Commonwealth jurisdictions, in the United States, traditionally, it has been the 
common law that has shaped the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation. However, 
now almost all jurisdictions in the United States have interested director statutes. The 
MBCA was designed to be a convenient guide for revision of state business corporation 
statutes, reflecting current views as to the appropriate accommodation of the various 
commercial and social interests involved in modern business corporations. It is designed 
for use by both publicly held and closely held corporations. 209 
Section 8.31 210 of the MBCA deals with conflict of interest transactions by a director 
with the corporation. The use of the term "transaction" will be immediately noted. In the 
s141(1) 
Official Text to Revised Model Business Corporation Act adopted by Committee on 
Corporate Law of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the 
American Bar Association Spring 1984, Law & Business Inc/Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, New York at xvii . 
See Appendix 2 of this paper 
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context of s144 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,211 Folk comments:212 
"The statute is all-inclusive within the area delineated by its language. Director 
interest may exist, inter alia, in sales and purchases of property of all sorts, 
contracts between the corporation and an officer or director, compensation of 
officers and directors, loans or an issue of stock or stock options to such persons, 
and corporate mergers where a director stands on both sides of the transaction. 
Director interest may also exist where determinations with respect to 
indemnification are made (unless displaced by the specific provisions of section 
145), and where determinations are made with respect to maintaining suits by the 
corporation against persons allegedly injuring it. 11 
Section 8.31 applies to transactions in which a director213 has an interest, either directly 
or indirectly. An "indirect interest" has an extended definition214 including the term 
"material financial interest" .215 
Essentially section 8.31 is negative in effect. Transactions covered by the section are not 
voidable solely because of a director's interest in the transaction.216 Instead three 
procedures are provided for to sustain what would otherwise be a self-interested 
transaction. They are: 
1) approval by the directors (ss8.3 l(a)(l) and 8.3 l(c)); 
2) approval by the shareholders (ss8 .3 l(a)(2) and 8.3 l(d)); 
3) fairness (s8.3 l(a)(3)). 
The Delaware equivalent to section 8.31 . 
EL Folk Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law (3rd ed) Little, Brown and 
Company, 1992 Cumulative Supplement No. 2, Boston at 144.3. 
Section 8.31 does not apply to officers, employees or any shareholder of the 
corporation. C.f. s126 of the New Zealand Act. 
s8.3 l(b) 
C.f s139(1)(b) of the New Zealand Act. 
C.f. s140(3) of the New Zealand Act. 
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Little is to be gained by an analysis of the MBCA's approval procedures. The drafters of 
the New Zealand Act obviously shunned the adoption of express approval procedures for 
self-interested transactions. Under the New Zealand Act a self-interested transaction can 
only be avoided if the company does not receive fair value under it. 217 Accordingly, 
American authority on the concept of fairness to the corporation will be relevant and 
should be helpful. 
1. Entire Fairness 
The leading American case is Weinberger v UOP, Inc.218 In this case, a corporation 
which was the majority shareholder of a subsidiary corporation sought, and acquired, the 
remaining shares of the subsidiary by a merger transaction, including the payment of cash 
to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary for their shares. A group of the minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary, who had not sold their shares for the merger attacked the 
validity of the merger transaction. In particular, the minority shareholders pointed to the 
fact that certain individuals had acted in a dual capacity as directors of both the parent and 
the subsidiary corporations. The Supreme Court of Delaware stated the fairness test as 
follows: 219 
s141(2) 
"There is no "safe harbor" for such divided loyalties in Delaware. When directors 
of Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to 
demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of 
the bargain. The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where 
one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its 
entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts. 
There is no dilution of this obligation where one holds dual or multiple 
directorships, as in a parent-subsidiary context . . . . Thus, individuals who act in a 
dual capacity as directors of two corporations, one of whom is parent and the 
other subsidiary, owe the same duty of good management to both corporations, 
and in the absence of an independent negotiating structure ... , or the directors' 
457 A.2d 701 
Ibid at 710, 711 
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total abstention from any participation in the matter, this duty is to be exercised in 
light of what is best for both companies. 11 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
In respect to "an independent negotiating structure" the Court pointed to the desirability 
of an independent negotiating committee of outside directors and that if the directors were 
on an arm's length basis that is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of 
fairness. 220 
Under the Weinberger test, directors who stand on both sides of a transaction are required 
to prove the entire fairness of the transaction. The court also described the two basic 
aspects of the fairness test: "fair dealing and fair price." 
• Fair dealing "embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals 
of the directors and stockholders were obtained.221 
• Fair price "relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed 
merger, including all relevant factors : assets, market value, earnings, future 
prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of 
company's stock. "222 
However, the Court did recognise circumstances which might mitigate the prima facie 
rule: 
"[E]ven though the ultimate burden of proof is on the majority shareholder to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair, it is first the 
burden of the plaintiff attacking the merger to demonstrate some basis for invoking 
the fairness obligation ... . However, where corporate action has been approved 
by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, we conclude that 
the burden entirely shifts to the plaintiff to show that the transaction was unfair to 
Ibid at 709, 710 
Ibid at 711 
Ibid 
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the minority . . . . But in all this, the burden clearly remains on those relying on 
the vote to show that they completely disclose all material facts relevant to the 
transaction. 11223 
(The underlining is the writer's) 
Accordingly, the plaintiff retains the initial burden of proof in order for the entire fairness 
test to be applied. However, if the transaction was approved by an informed vote of a 
majority of the minority shareholders, the plaintiff will also have the ultimate burden of 
proof to show "unfairness". 
On the facts of the Weinberger case, the Court found that the minority shareholder vote 
was not an informed one. Therefore the merger transaction did not meet the test of 
fairness and the burden of proof did not shift to the plaintiff 
It remains to be seen how far the New Zealand courts adopt the American regime of 
"entire fairness" . Of course, unlike the American statutes, the New Zealand Act does not 
use the term "fair".224 Instead the term "fair value" has been preferred. It may be that the 
concept of "fair value" has by the addition of the word "value" an increased emphasis on 
the financial or monetary side of the transaction. Like with so many aspects of the new 
Act, only time will tell. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
223 
224 
The new regime to govern self-interested transactions in the Companies Act 1993 is 
unique, a New Zealand hybrid of provisions from the North American statutes and other 
provisions which have no obvious equivalent in other jurisdictions. Compared with the 
regime under the Companies Act 1955, the new regime is complex and convoluted. But 
many of the new provisions are obviously designed to remedy the inadequacies in the 
common law and the law under the 1955 Act. The introduction of a criteria of materiality 
and the central concept of fairness to the company are but two examples. 
Ibid at 703 
Except, of course, s 161 
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Perhaps the major criticism that can be made against the new regime is that the reforms 
have not been consistently worked through the new legislation. The new Act applies a 
complex but inconsistent regime, especially in the context of closely held companies. 
There are, for example, curious anomolies in the application of the solvency test and in the 
provisions on unanimous agreements. 
Whether the new regime will, in practice, have a significant impact on the management of 
company business remains, of course, to be seen. From a practical point of view, in the 
day to day management of many companies, this is to be doubted. Few directors, 
particularly those of closely held companies, will have the inclination to familiarise 
themselves with the intricacies of the new regime. No doubt remuneration and other 
benefits will continue to be paid out to directors with scant regard to concepts of fairness, 
disclosure, materiality and the solvency test. Indeed, prudent practical advice might well 
be to ignore the regime. In the event, it is likely that the effectiveness of the regime will 
be tested in the context of company liquidations. Hopefully it will provide the appropriate 
balance between the interests of directors and the companies they manage. 
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Appendix 1 
Section 120 of the Canada Business Corporations Act provides: 
"120 (1) A director or officer of a corporation who 
(a) is a party to a material contract or proposed material contract with the corporation, or 
(b) is a director or an officer of or has a material interest in any person who is a party to a 
material contract or proposed material contract with the corporation, 
shall disclose in writing to the corporation or request to have entered in the minutes of meetings 
of directors the nature and extent of his interest. 
(2) The disclosure required by subsection (1) shall be made, in the case of a director, 
(a) at the meeting which a proposed contract is first considered; 
(b) if the director was not then interested in a proposed contract, at the first meeting after he 
becomes so interested; 
(c) if the director becomes interested after a contract is made, at the first meeting after he 
becomes so interested; or 
(d) if a person who is interested in a contract later becomes a director, at the first meeting 
after he becomes a director. 
(3) The disclosure required by subsection (1) shall be made, in the case of an officer who is 
not a director, 
(a) forthwith after he becomes aware that the contract or proposed contract is to be 
considered or has been considered at a meeting of directors; 
(b) if the officer becomes interested after a contract is made, forthwith after he becomes so 
interested; or 
(c) if a person who is interested in a contract later becomes an officer, forthwith after he 
becomes an officer. 
( 4) If a material contract or proposed material contract is one that, in the ordinary course of 
the corporation's business, would not require approval by the directors or shareholders, a director 
or officer shall disclose in writing to the corporation or request to have entered in the minutes of 
meetings of directors the nature and extent of his interest forthwith after the director of officer 
becomes aware of the contract or proposed contract. 
(5) A director referred to in subsection (1) shall not vote on any resolution to approve the 
contact unless the contract is 
(a) an arrangement by way of security for money lent to or obligations undertaken by him 
for the benefit of the corporation or an affiliate; 
(b) one relating primarily to his remuneration as a director, officer, employee or agent of 
the corporation or an affiliate; 
(c) one for indemnity or insurance under section 124; or 
(d) one with an affiliate. 
(6) For the purposes of this section, a general notice to the directors by a director or officer, 
declaring that he is a director or officer of or has a material interest in a person and is to be 
regarded as interested in any contract made with that person, is a sufficient declaration of interest 
in relation to any contract so made. 
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(7) A material contract between a corporation and one or more of its directors or officers, or 
between a corporation and another person of which a director or officer of the corporation is a 
director or officer or in which he has a material interest, is neither void nor voidable by reason 
only of that relationship or by reason only that a director with an interest in the contract is 
present at or is counted to determine the presence of a quorum at a meeting of directors or 
committee or directors that authorized the contract, if the director or officer disclosed his interest 
in accordance with subsection (2), (3), (4) or (6), as the case may be, and the contract was 
approved by the directors or the shareholders and it was reasonable and fair to the corporation at 
the time it was approved. 
(8) Where a director or officer of a corporation fails to disclose his interest in a material 
contract in accordance with this section, a court may, on the application of the corporation or a 
shareholder of the corporation, set aside the contract on such terms as it thinks fit." 
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Appendix 2 
Section 8.31 of the United States Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides: 
"8.31. DIRECTOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transaction with the corporation in which a director of 
the corporation has a direct or indirect interest. A conflict of interest transaction is not 
voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's interest in the transaction if any 
one of the following is true: 
( 1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or 
known to the board of directors or a committee of the board of directors and the 
board of directors or committee authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction; 
(2) the material acts of the transaction and the director's interest were disclosed or 
known to the shareholders entitled to vote and they authorized, approved, or 
ratified the transaction; or 
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation. 
(b) For purposes of this section, a director of the corporation has an indirect interest in a 
transaction if (1) another entity in which he has a material financial interest or in which he 
is a general partner is a party to the transaction or (2) another entity of which he is a 
director, officer, or trustee is a party to the transaction and the transaction is or should be 
considered by the board of directors of the corporation. 
(c) For purposes of subsection (a)(l), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, 
or ratified if it received the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors on the board of 
directors (or on the committee) who have no direct or indirect interest in the transaction, 
but a transaction may not be authorized, approved, or ratified under this section by a single 
director. If a majority of the directors who have no direct or indirect interest in the 
transaction vote to authorize, approve, or ratify the transaction, a quorum is present for the 
purpose of taking action under this section. The presence of, or a vote cast by, a director 
with a direct or indirect interest in the transaction does not affect the validity of any action 
taken under subjection (a)(l) if the transaction is otherwise authorized, approved, or ratified 
as provided in that subjection. 
(d) For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a conflict of interest transaction is authorized, approved, 
or ratified if it receives the vote of a majority of the shares entitled to be countered under 
this subsection. Shares owned by or voted under the control of a director who has a direct 
or indirect interest in the transaction, and shares owned by or voted under the control of an 
entity described in subsection (b )( 1 ), may not be counted in a vote of shareholders to 
determine whether to authorize, approve, or ratify a conflict of interest transaction under 
subsection (a)(2). The vote of those shares, however, is counted in determining whether the 
transaction is approved under other sections of this Act. A majority of the shares, whether 
or not present, that are entitled to be counted in a vote on the transaction under this 
subsection constitutes a quorum for the purposes of taking action under this section. 
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